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Chile’s Human Rights 
Foreign Policy and RtoP
 
 
Claudia Fuentes Julio
This chapter examines Chile’s responses to the international norm 
known as Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) and places it within the 
greater context of Chile’s foreign policy since the transition to de-
mocracy.1  It argues that Chile’s support of RtoP is highly consistent 
with the objectives and international strategies developed by the new 
democratic authorities that since early in the 1990s decided to actively 
include human rights as an integral part of Chile’s national interest. 
Chile is recognized today as an international human rights promoter, 
praised by organizations such as Human Rights Watch as one of the 
most influential nations from the Global South in the promotion and 
protection of universal human rights (Kenneth, 2009; HRW, 2010, 
2011).
The first part of this article highlights Chile’s trajectory within the in-
ternational human rights regime including ratification of human rights 
treaties, participation at the UN Human Rights Council and other 
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 relevant institutions protecting human rights, and Chile’s support 
to UN peace-keeping operations. It highlights that among the main 
objectives of the first democratic government led by the center-left 
coalition in power (“Coalition of Parties for Democracy” or CPD) was 
to actively promote the reinsertion of Chile into the community of 
democratic states as a way of recovering the country’s international 
credibility that was lost due to the multiple condemnations made by 
international institutions, states, and transnational NGOs aiming to 
stop the human rights abuses perpetrated by the military regime. The 
CPD promoted the notion that a relatively small country like Chile 
without geostrategic or economic prominence needs to search for 
alternative sources of power actively participating in the creation and 
strengthening of international norms and institutions and reinforcing 
Chile’s traditional emphasis on international law and multilateralism 
as a way of leveling the playing field among nations.
Against this backdrop, the promotion of international human rights 
became an integral part of Chile’s international strategy during the 
more than twenty years that this coalition was in power.2 One of the 
key conditions for Chile to become a human rights promoter was the 
presence of domestic actors at relevant positions in the government 
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs willing to mobilize, promote, and 
legitimize human rights ideas into the foreign policy process. These 
actors shared common values, had similar beliefs about what constitu-
tes Chile’s national interest and, most importantly, developed concrete 
foreign policy initiatives with an emphasis on international human 
rights and the promotion of democracy. This same dynamic is also 
responsible for Chile’s more recent commitment to the RtoP norm. 
The second part of this article specifically assesses Chile’s international 
stance on RtoP since the concept was first introduced by the Inter-
national Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
in 2001. Particular attention is paid to Chile’s position towards RtoP 
within UN forums and especially during the 2005 UN World Summit, 
when the country supported the inclusion of specific international 
commitments endorsing RtoP in the Outcome Document. Also a brief 
discussion of Chile’s response to the most current and more contro-
versial issues regarding RtoP such as the recent implementation of the 
norm in Libya (2011) and the failure to respond to massive human 
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rights atrocities in Syria is also included. The chapter ends with some 
conclusions regarding the challenges ahead for the second administra-
tion of Michelle Bachelet (2014-2018) in the context of Chile’s seat 
at the UNSC (2014-2015) and the need to further mobilize domestic 
and international assets for the normative advance, consolidation, and 
implementation of RtoP.
Chile’s Human Rights Foreign Policy 
Why Chile became a Human Rights Promoter?
Chile’s involvement with the promotion of universal human rights 
dates back to the creation of what is today the international human 
rights regime after the Second World War. Chilean diplomats along 
with a reduced number of leaders from other developing countries 
particularly from Asia and Latin America were able to play a significant 
role during the drafting of the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Chile’s Permanent 
Representative at the UN, Hernán Santa Cruz, was one among the 
group of ten international figures who drafted the UDHR in 1948 
(Sikkink, 1993(b)/2004; Reus-Smit, 2011). Chile was also active in 
the ensuing debate.  Speaking in the Third Committee of the General 
Assembly on the draft Declaration, the Chilean Representative stated 
almost prophetically “no one could infringe upon the rights proclaimed 
in it [the Universal Declaration] without becoming an outcast from 
the community of states”(Reus-Smit, 2011: 532).
The coup d’état in 1973 and subsequent military regime broke Chile’s 
traditional engagement with the international human rights system. 
During this period, Chile’s participation in the United Nations and 
other international and regional forum was drastically reduced. Those 
very same international institutions that Chile had helped to create 
were at the forefront of the fight against the massive human rights 
violations perpetrated by the military regime. The United Nations con-
demned the Chilean government several times, at critical moments of 
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state repression. Following the coup against President Salvador Allende, 
the United Nations established an ad hoc working group (1975) to 
inquire into the situation of human rights in the country. This ad hoc 
working group is generally perceived to be the first “Special Procedure” 
of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.3 In 1979, this 
working group was replaced by a special rapporteur and two experts 
to study the fate of the disappeared. This led to the establishment of 
the first thematic Special Procedure in 1980: The Working Group on 
Disappearances to deal with the question of enforced disappearances 
throughout the world. The Inter-American Commission on Human 
rights also presented several reports on the human rights situation of 
the country.4
By late 1970s and early-1980s, Chile was increasingly seen as a pariah 
state within the international community and the country’s inter-
national image was at its lowest levels. Chile’s relations with Latin 
American countries dramatically deteriorated after the country decided 
to withdraw from the Andean Pact; some European countries issued 
complaints against the country due to the killing of their nationals in 
Chile’s territory—most notably Spain, and the lessening of United 
States’ support after the killing in 1976 of the former Chilean Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, Orlando Letelier and his American assistant, 
Ronni Moffit, in Washington DC significantly affected the country’s 
standing within the international community. Agents of the Chilean 
secret police planned and perpetrated this assassination, the first one 
of this kind committed not only beyond Latin American borders but 
in US soil and with one local casualty. The international repercussions 
of the killings were considerable and accentuated international criti-
cism of the military regime. In the words of the Chilean diplomat and 
scholar, Heraldo Muñoz: “…each time the government increases its 
authoritarian measures domestically there will be a revitalization of the 
negative image of the regimen externally and political isolationism will 
continue characterizing the foreign relations of the military regime” 
(Muñoz, 1982: 597). 
The reestablishment of democracy opened an enormous window of 
opportunity for the restoration of Chile’s diplomatic prestige.  Con-
sistent with its historical tradition, and in light of the new democratic 
government’s redefined objectives, Chile’s most immediate foreign 
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policy objective was to re-insert itself into the international community. 
Promotion of human rights became an integral part of the country’s 
international strategy. The newly elected President Patricio Aylwin 
defined this objective clearly in his 1992 State of the Union—a speech 
that traditionally has an almost exclusive domestic focus— in which 
he explains the importance of human rights for Chile’s foreign policy:
We consider that the defense of human rights is an ineluctable 
duty of any government that is committed to peace, one in 
which there is no room for invoking the principle of non- in-
tervention. As a designated member of the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission, Chile will act according to this 
conception (Aylwin in Morande and Aranda, 2010: 95).
The need to recover Chile’s international prestige and the value that 
the new elected President Patricio Aylwin placed on getting interna-
tional support toward a domestic agenda aiming to a stable transition 
to democracy prompted the first democratic government to fully 
embrace international human rights. Foreign Policy decisions made 
during Aylwin’s term paved the way for the next three administrations 
of the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (CPD) (Eduardo Frei, 1994-
2000, Ricardo Lagos, 2000-2006 and, Michelle Bachelet, 2006-2010) 
to adopt human rights as a salient foreign policy objective. Chile’s 
interest in international human rights was further enhanced by the 
personal commitment to democratic and human rights values embra-
ced by the political authorities from the CPD that governed Chile, 
including a group of international relations experts that took leading 
positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for four consecutive 
presidential terms (Fuentes and Fuentes, 2014; Fuentes Julio, 2014). 
President Michelle Bachelet is one of the clearest examples of a leader 
employing ethical principles as a motive for action. During her time 
in office she was particularly sensitive to the topic, as she herself was 
a victim of the Pinochet regime’s ruthless methods of torture and im-
prisonment. Explaining the Chilean commitment to the UN Security 
Council, Bachelet indicated: 
You will be aware of my own personal experience with the 
abuse of human rights. Those were painful times for me, for 
my family, and for my country. They were certainly the darkest 
chapter in Chile’s history (...). But we are striving to create 
Chile’s Human Rights Foreign Policy and RtoP
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
100
a world in which such abuses are no longer possible. Nunca 
Más, never again, as we said in Chile after our experience in 
the 1970s and 1980s. And that is what we must also say in the 
United Nations, and act accordingly. Chile subscribes fully to 
a broad concept of freedom and emancipation under which 
respect for human rights—along with economic and social 
development, peace and security—is one of the pillars of the 
mission of the United Nations in this new century. As such we 
would like to contribute with our experience and commitment 
to the new Human Security Council (Bachelet, 2011).5
In sum, Chile’s foreign policy for the more than twenty years that was 
under the Coalition of Democratic parties was led by a group of politi-
cal leaders who shared a common understanding of the importance of 
human rights in domestic and international policies. Most importantly, 
this group of people managed to match words with deeds. During their 
time in office, they led and developed concrete foreign policy initia-
tives with an emphasis on international human rights, the promotion 
of democracy, and most recently RtoP.6 As the following assessment 
illustrates, Chile became particularly active in three areas international 
areas with an important human rights focus: a) the ratification of major 
international human rights instruments; b) participation in multilateral 
organizations that promote peace, human rights and democracy; and 
c) Peace Promotion and peacekeeping operations under the auspices 
of the United Nations. Together, these three priorities helped to pave 
the way for Chile’s support of RtoPin the early 2000s.
Assessing Chile’s International Human Rights Performance 
Human Rights Instruments 
Chile has ratified a number of international human rights treaties sin-
ce the return of democracy in 1990 (See Table 1). It has also recently 
ratified the following human rights instruments: the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169); the Second 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty; the Protocol to 
the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death 
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Penalty; the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; 
and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Chile 
formally joined the International Criminal Court in 2009, ten years 
after signing its founding treaty.7 At the regional level, Chile ratified 
the American Convention and recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court only a few months after its transition to democracy.
Table 1.  
Selected Human Rights and Humanitarian Treaties: Chile
Treaties Year of 
Ratification
American Convention of Human Rights 1990
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1972
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights
1972
Convention Against Torture 1988
Ottawa Convention 2001
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 2008
ILO C169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention  2008
International Convention for the Protection of All 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance
2009
International Criminal Court/ Rome Statue 2009
Source: Coalition for the International Criminal Court. http://www.iccnow.
org/?mod=country&iduct=35; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en
Human Rights Organizations
Chile has been active in various multilateral organizations with an 
important human rights mandate (see table 2). Since the 1990s, the 
country has been elected twice (1996-1997/2003-2004) to a non-
permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) in spite of an 
intense domestic debate on the possible political costs associated with 
such a post particularly during the US-led war in Iraq.  From 2014-2015, 
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Chile will once again occupy a non- permanent seat at the UNSC. 
Chile has also actively participated in the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC), even holding the presidency on several occasions. 
It also supported the creation of the UN Peace-Building Commission in 
2005, holding the presidency of that organization for two years. Since 
1999 Chile has been part of the Human Security Network,8 a group 
of likeminded countries that have made human security an integral 
part of their foreign policy concerns (Brauch and Fuentes J., 2009). 
The country was one of the founding members of the Community 
of Democracies9, a global, intergovernmental coalition of democratic 
countries, whose goal is the promotion of democratic rules and the 
strengthening of democratic norms and institutions around the world.
Since the 1990s, Chile was also an active participant at the UN Human 
Rights Commission sponsoring and co-sponsoring important initiatives 
and resolutions especially on issues such as the right to truth and re-
parations for victims of mass atrocities. After the 2006 merging of the 
Commission into the Human Rights Council, Chile continued with 
its strategy of supporting institutions for the protection and promotion 
of human rights within the UN. Indeed, Chile has been praised by 
Human Rights Watch as one of the most influential countries from 
the Global South in the promotion and protection of universal human 
rights internationally (Kenneth, 2009; HRW, 2010, 2011).  Human 
Rights Watch latest report (2011) on the Council’s work states that 
“Chile has a strong and coherent voting record at the Council. Its po-
sitions are based on a principled approach to human rights, which is 
consistent and non-selective”. The country has been elected member 
of the Council twice (2008 and 2011) for three years terms and in 
2009 it was selected as Vice-president of the Council for one year to 
represent its regional group. In terms of resolutions addressing country 
or special sessions considering urgent situation’s, Chile systematically 
voted in favor of examining situations or resolutions o Sudan, North 
Korea, Iran, Belarus, Sri Lanka, Congo and Syria  (HRW, 2011). 
In terms of initiatives on the HRC, Chile has been an important 
actor when it comes to supporting the effective implementation of 
the Council’s mandate to respond promptly to human rights emer-
gencies. It was a cosponsor of the special session on Libya and the 
only council member of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean 
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countries to sponsor the resolution on Iran, which led to the creation 
of the special rapporteur mandate (HRW, 2011). In a note to the UN 
General Assembly presenting its candidacy for reelection to the Hu-
man Rights Council, this point was made fairly clear by the Chilean 
delegation: “We believe that, as part of the Council’s action, there can 
and must be a strengthening of the procedures for the early warning 
of and response to situations of mass violations of human rights in a 
particular State, including special sessions, on-site visits and stronger 
resolutions on such countries” (Permanent Mission of Chile at the 
General Assembly, 2011).10
Table 2
Chile’s Participation in Multilateral Initiatives  
with a human rights mandate
UN Institution Years of Participation  (since the 1990s)
Security Council 1996-1997, 2003-2004, 2014-2015
Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) Presidency 1993, 1998 (Juan Somavia)
UN Human Rights 
Commission Member from1998-2000,2002-2004
UN Human Rights 
Council 2008-2014
Peace-building 
Commission (PBC) Presidency 2009-2010 (Heraldo Munoz)
UN Peacekeeping UNIKOM (Iraq – Kuwait), 1991-1993
UNTAC (Cambodia), 1992-1993 
ONUSAL (El Salvador), 1992-1995
MOMEP (Ecuador- Peru), 1995, 1999
UNSCOM (Iraq), 1996-1998
UNMIBH (Bosnia Herzegovina),1997-2002
UNTAET (Timor Oriental), 2000-2002
UNMOVIC (Iraq), 2000-2003
UNMIK (Kosovo), 2000-Present
UNFICYP(Chipre), 2001-Present
UNMISET (Timor Leste), 2002-2003
MONUC (DRC), 2003
UNAMA (Afghanistan), 2003-2004
MINUSTAH(Haiti)2004-Present
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Other Initiatives:
Human Security Network
Community of 
Democracies
1999-PresentPresidency 2001-2002
2000-Present, Presidency 2003-2005
Source: Authors’ table. United Nations: http://www.un.org/; Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores de Chile: www.minrel.gov.cl; CECOPAC-Chile: http://
www.cecopac.cl/chile_en_opaz/contribucion.html
UN Peacekeeping Operations 
Chile’s respond to the international intervention in Kosovo in 1999 
was originally cautious, explicitly making manifest the concern about 
NATO’S decision to intervene without UN approval. This position is 
probably due to the coincidental arrest of General Pinochet in Lon-
don and the need to be consistent with the notion advanced by the 
country´s state officials that prosecuting Pinochet outside Chilean 
jurisdiction was not in the interest of Chile, a sovereign state capable 
of judging him at home. Yet, Chile ultimately condemned the atrocities 
perpetrated in Kosovo and decided to participate in peacekeeping and 
policing in the area when solicited by the UN (Serrano, 2000).
Chile also contributed to peacekeeping operations in Iraq, Cambodia, 
and El Salvador, among other missions. However, it was not until 2010 
that Chile drastically increased its participation in peacekeeping, sen-
ding troops to the Multinational Force for Haiti and later to the United 
Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). With more than 
500 troops on the ground since the beginning of the mission in 2004, 
Chilean officials see participating in MINUSTAH as one of its grea-
test contribution to the protection of human rights, human security 
and regional peace. The latter point is continuously emphasized by 
Chilean delegates, which indicate that this operation is at the core a 
regional one.  Two Chilean diplomats have been selected as Special 
Representatives of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission since 
the beginning of the mission in 2004. Additionally, since 2010 Chile’s 
International Cooperation Agency (AGCI) has been implementing 
programs on education and development in the Caribbean nation.11
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Chilean Foreign Policy and RtoP
Chile’s road to RtoP
Due to Chile’s strong support for the promotion of international 
human rights and its concrete foreign policy agenda on the subject, 
the country was already primed to understand and embrace the nor-
mative aspirations embodied by the Responsibility to Protect. In 
May, 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty’s (ICISS) choose to hold their regional consultations 
in Santiago, where they prepared the RtoP report. The host country 
immediately demonstrated its solidarity with the Commission and 
the proposed concept of RtoP. In the consultation’s opening address, 
Soledad Alvear, Chile’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, referred to inter-
national intervention as a subject closely related “to life and death,” 
and one that international organizations, despite all their technolo-
gical progress, have been unable to effectively address. She further 
indicated that “… massacres and other major aggressions against 
humankind continue to occur, to the dismay of the international 
community. All this urgently requires international organizations and 
UN state members to compromise on a common approach.” (ICISS, 
Part III-Background: 369).
The next opportunity for Chile to state its position in relation to RtoP 
was during the 2005 UN World Summit, when the country supported 
the inclusion of specific international commitments endorsing RtoP in 
the Outcome Document. As expressed by the former Chilean Minister 
of Foreign Relations, Ignacio Walker, at the Sixtieth Session of the 
UN General Assembly, “When States are unable or unwilling to act 
this organization cannot remain indifferent in the face of genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. We have 
an international responsibility to protect which we cannot ethically 
shrink” (Walker, 2005: 2). 
The World Summit Outcome Document contains two paragraphs 
on the Responsibility to Protect. Paragraph 138 declares that “each 
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including 
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their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means….” Pa-
ragraph139 states that “the international community, through the 
United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplo-
matic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
In this context, we are prepared to take collective action in a timely 
and decisive manner through the Security Council in accordance with 
the Charter, including Chapter VII…”
The Chilean representatives to the UN endorsed these paragraphs on 
RtoP because they contained three elements that were at the core of 
the delegation’s concerns at that time. First, they stated that the issue 
being considered was not “the right to intervene” but the responsibility 
of every state to protect its population. Thus, the debate was shifted 
from the more traditional rhetoric regarding humanitarian interven-
tion to a debate wherein each state and the international community 
would share the onus of protecting human beings from gross human 
rights violations. 
Second, the Chilean delegation insisted on its interpretation of the 
Responsibility to Protect as a “continuum,” which included the inter-
national responsibility to prevent and assist (Labbe, 2005). It argued 
that efforts to prevent genocide and other crimes against humanity 
needed to address root causes, such as hatred among ethnic groups 
and inequality among various groups within a country. 
Finally, in accordance with the UN Charter, the Chilean delegation 
concurred with the idea of a collective international obligation to 
take timely and decisive action when needed. The concept of decisi-
ve action included the provisional use of coercive tactics only under 
certain extreme conditions and only with the collective consent of the 
Security Council. Chile, along with Mexico and Japan, floated these 
ideas in a non-paper, which was meant to facilitate discussion prior to 
the World Summit; the document clearly emphasized the importance 
of strengthening conflict prevention mechanisms as part of the RtoP 
framework.12
In July 2009, for the first time since the adoption of the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document, the UN General Assembly met to re-
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consider the responsibility to protect (RtoP) agenda. On this occasion, 
the General Assembly gathered specifically to discuss the UN Secretary, 
General Ban Ki-Moon’s report “Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect.” Chile once again confirmed its commitment to RtoP, suppor-
ting Ban Ki-moon’s call to turn RtoP into an operational concept. Chile 
endorsed the Secretary General’s formulation of a three pillar strategy: 
state responsibility, assistance to states, and timely and decisive action 
by the international community. Chile acknowledged the importance 
of the first two pillars, but also insisted on the essentiality of generating 
preventive instruments to avoid mass atrocities, specifically through 
the promotion of democracy (Muñoz, 2009b).
From 2001, when the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty (ICISS) presented its original report, through 
the most recent debates at the United Nations that have taken place 
in the last two years regarding the implementation of RtoP, Chile 
has continually insisted on the need for a political debate about the 
practical and consensual implementation of RtoP. Two topics appear 
prominently in Chile’s official statements on RtoP: clarifying the 
conceptual and practical relationship between sovereignty and non-
intervention, and defining the precise scope of RtoP as well as the 
criteria for intervention. 
Regarding the sovereignty debate, it is worth noting that support for the 
principle of non-intervention has traditionally been very strong in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. As early as 1933, at the Inter-American 
Conference in Montevideo, Latin American countries had already 
crafted a repudiation of the Roosevelt Doctrine. The Convention of 
Rights and Duties of the States indicated that “no state has the right 
to intervene in the external or internal affairs of one another” (Coopper 
and Legler, 2006). The concept of Responsibility to Protect once again 
brought the tension of “sovereignty versus intervention” back to Latin 
America, and into the international debate.
Heraldo Muñoz, Permanent Representative of Chile to the UN, ex-
pressed the nature of this debate very clearly: 
During the cold war, many countries in Latin America, in-
cluding my own, suffered dictatorial repression with crimes 
against humanity. The Nixon administration actively contri-
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buted to the tragedy in my country while others, both from 
the North and the South, kept silent. During the 80s, dictator-
ships began making way to restored democracies. The legacy 
of extrajudicial killings, disappearances of political prisoners 
and torture still haunts Latin American societies with its 
consequences. Our countries felt caught between a rock and 
a hard place. Most Latin American leaders wished to explore 
a better alternative to the stark choice between inaction vs. 
unilateral external intervention in case of a humanitarian crisis 
(Muñoz, 2009a:3)
As the previous quote illustrates, unlike other Latin American autho-
rities that claim that RtoP is a threat to their sovereignty or represents 
a new form of interventionism, Chilean leaders have insisted that no 
country is less sovereign because of its willingness to accept an inter-
national responsibility to respond to mass atrocities. Chilean policy 
makers have explicitly indicated that RtoP is a legitimate alternative 
for responding to humanitarian crises. Yet, there is a much broader 
discussion – one which carries beyond the scope of RtoP – in the 
Latin American context. It considers when and by which means it is 
justifiable to intervene in a domestic or regional crisis. This discussion 
revolves around the application of the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter and how to respond to a democratic crisis. It has opened the 
regional debate over sovereignty versus collective response to defend 
democracy and prevent gross human rights violations in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (Sikkink, 1993 (a); Farer 1993/1996; Muñoz, 1998; 
Coopper and Legler, 2006).
The second topic regards the scope and the criteria for responding to 
atrocities. Chilean authorities view this subject as critical to making 
interventions legitimate. Chilean foreign policymakers have stated 
clearly that in order to avoid misinterpretations and potential abuses 
of the concept, the most viable political alternative is to narrow RtoP’s 
focus and decide on concrete methods of implementation. “To make it 
workable in real life, the concept must be saved from friends and foes 
by narrowing its focus and making RtoP as operational as possible so as 
to effectively implement it …” (Muñoz, 2009b:1). This was precisely 
the intention of the 2005 UN World Summit Document and the 2009 
Secretary General Report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect. 
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Both documents were strongly supported by the Chilean delegation 
to the United Nations. In terms of scope, Chilean authorities insisted 
on narrowing RtoP to just four crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity as outlined in paragraph 139 
of the UN World Summit Document. In Muñoz words, “… not all 
humanitarian tragedies or human rights violations can or should ac-
tivate the RtoP” (Muñoz, 2009b: 2).
When considering activating RtoP at the international level, the 
Chilean delegation to the UN emphasized that, in order to protect the 
civilian population from mass atrocities, the international community 
is obliged to use the peaceful means outlined in Chapters VI and VIII of 
the UN Charter as a first resort (Labbe, 2005). Additionally, as the UN 
World Summit Outcome Document (2005) indicates, non-peaceful 
collective action is subject to at least two conditions: the determina-
tion to take collective action on a case-by-case basis and only “should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from genocide…” Again the Chilean 
delegation concurred with narrowing down the coercive components of 
RtoP, so that they would only be applied under certain extreme condi-
tions and only through the collective action of the Security Council. 
As indicated by Heraldo Muñoz in the 2009 UN General Assembly, 
“It is clear that the collective obligation is not to intervene, but rather 
to adopt whatever timely and decisive actions the international com-
munity deems appropriate, in accordance with the UN Charter. There 
is no automaticity, triggers, or implicit green lights for coercive action 
in what the world leaders agreed upon” (Muñoz, 2009a: 2).
One aspect that the Chilean position has underscored is the necessary 
emphasis on prevention as a means of addressing mass atrocities; acting 
in advance and tackling the root causes of conflict and mass atrocities. 
As indicated in the 2005 UN debate, “Chile views the responsibility 
to protect as a ‘continuum’ that includes international prevention 
and assistance entities and functions, and as the development and 
creation of national capacities” (Labbe 2005: 4). Specifically, Chile has 
pointed out that the best “strategy for preventing the occurrence of 
the RtoP crimes should contemplate the promotion of democracy…In 
the long run, the expansion of democracy could be a useful means for 
preventing the occurrence of atrocities, thus avoiding the recurrence 
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of the third pillar that could lead to coercive measure on the part of 
the international community”(Muñoz, 2009a: 9). 
Finally and in light with Chile’s commitment to RtoP at the United 
Nations, the country is part of several international networks aiming to 
promote this concept. Chile is part of the nations that are “Friends of 
RtoP” acting as an informal group within the United Nations in order 
to promote, discuss, and concert positions when RtoP situations arise. 
The Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also convened a couple 
of seminars in partnership with the Global Centre for Responsibility 
to Protect through their mission in New York to discuss relevant as-
pects of RtoP particularly from a regional perspective.13  Also, Chilean 
nationals occupying relevant positions in international organizations 
have actively participated in international seminars to discuss the 
prospects for consolidating and implementing RtoP.  Heraldo Muñoz, 
former Chilean Ambassador at the UN and now current Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Bachelet’s second administration has written a series 
of papers on the subject and was very active as the head of the Peace 
Building Commission. He was also pivotal in framing the Chilean 
response to RtoP and he is widely recognized among the diplomatic 
community as an RtoP supporter. In 2012, Michele Bachelet, acting 
as the Executive Director of UN Women, participated as a key speaker 
at the Stanley Foundation presenting her vision on the prospect for 
the Responsibility to Protect in the next decade.14
Chile’s position on Libya and Syria 
The crisis in Libya and Syria are probably two of the best case examples 
to demonstrate the difficulties for implementing RtoP as an inter-
national norm. In the case of Chile, it also coincides with the arrival 
in March 2010—exactly a year before the crisis in Libya started— of 
President Sebastian Piñera as the newly elected President and the first 
right-wing leader in fifty-two years to win an election democratically. 
Even though human rights was not explicitly a foreign policy priority 
of Piñera’s Presidency and underscoring that his government placed 
special attention and resources to international economic policies, 
there are important signs of continuity when comes to Chile’s position 
on the responsibility to protect and its diplomatic responses to RtoP 
situations in the Middle East. 
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During the Special Session of the UN Human Rights Council 
(UNHRC) on the situation in Libya in on the February, 25 2011 
Ambassador Oyarce condemned the human rights violations in the 
country asking for immediate responses from the UNHRC. Oyarce 
explicitly used RtoP language referring to the humanitarian emergency 
in Libya: 
“Todo estado tiene la responsabilidad de proteger a sus ciudada-
nos, asegurando la protección de los derechos humanos. La co-
munidad internacional debe alentar, ayudar y exigir a los países 
ejercer dicha obligación, utilizando todos los medios políticos y 
diplomáticos posibles (…) Instamos al gobierno Libio a cumplir 
su responsabilidad de proteger sus ciudadanos y llamamos a 
la comunidad internacional a intensificar sus esfuerzos para 
garantizar esa protección”. 
Even though Chile was not part of the UN Security Council to vote 
on the resolutions on Libya imposing sanctions (Res. 1970) and au-
thorizing a non-fly zone and the use of force by NATO (Res. 1973), 
Chile’s position was of support. On the open debate on the protection 
of civilian in armed conflict in 2013, Ambassador Errazuriz, Chile’ 
representative to the UN explicitly supported both resolutions:
“However, States themselves hold the primary responsibility for 
protecting their populations. They must create early warning 
and conflict detection mechanisms and adopt corresponding 
preventive measures. As that has not always been possible, 
however, the Council has had to take the measures necessary 
to adequately protect civilians in conflict situations. The 
adoption of resolutions 1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) on Libya 
responds to that need. The measures contemplated in those 
resolutions are adequate for the protection of civilians, and 
their implementation must also be so. When States cannot 
protect their civilians, the international community, through 
the United Nations, cannot remain indifferent to the fate 
of those whose rights are being seriously, systematically and 
repeatedly violated” (Errazuriz, 2013).
Unlike other Latin American countries, Chile did not entered into 
the debate regarding the interpretation and operationalization of 
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Res.1973 on Libya. Furthermore, there is no official statement on 
NATO’s action in Libya regarding the controversy on whether or not 
the mission extended its mandate from the protection of civilians to 
regime change. As indicated on Brazil’s chapter in this volume, the 
issue of regime change lies at the heart of the Brazilian concept note, 
Responsibility while Protecting (RwP) presented in 2011. Yet, Chile did 
not entered into this debate nor did they use Brazil’s note (RwP) as a 
window of opportunity to further discussions on the Responsibility to 
Protect among Latin American countries. Unfortunately, the Brazilian 
proposal had very little resonance in the region and no country - nor 
Brazil as the leader of the initiative or the supporters of the concept 
such as Chile - took the lead to advocate for a Latin American debate 
on the subject.
In the case of Syria, since the beginning of the crisis Chile has sup-
ported a pacific and consensual resolution to the conflict based on 
political dialogue and negotiation between the parties. President 
Piñera strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons and “the 
indiscriminate use of force against the civilian population.” Beyond 
condemnation to the systematic human rights violations in Syria, Chile 
has reiterated in several occasions and in different UN forums the 
appeal for countries that have the veto power to refrain from using it 
in cases of massive atrocities. Speaking at the Opening of the 68th UN 
General Assembly, President Piñera urged veto-holding countries on 
the Security Council to “refrain from exercising that right in situations 
of crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide or ethnic cleansing.” 
More recently, and already as a non-permanent member of the United 
Nations Security Council, Chile’s delegation reiterated the appeal 
launched at the General Assembly, urging “the Security Council, in 
particular its permanent members, to shoulder that responsibility. Let 
us not forget the failures of recent years and the complex situations 
facing us today. May we not act too late” (Statement by Chile at the 
UNSC, April 2014). 
Chile also co- sponsored a draft resolution referring the situation in 
Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC).15 The resolution was 
voted on May, 22 (2014) and sought to refer the situation in Syria to 
the ICC for the investigation and subsequent punishment of those 
responsible. However, the resolution could not be adopted due to the 
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veto of China and Russia. After the voting, Chile’s delegation at the 
UNSC issued a statement indicating that:
“Chile sponsored the draft resolution in a spirit of openness 
and in the conviction that it represented a necessary step in 
obtaining justice for all the victims of the conflict in Syria, 
without any distinction between the various sides. Our coun-
try is a party to the Rome Statute and, as such, we believe 
that its integrity must be upheld so as to enable it to be fully 
implemented and effective in the fight against impunity. The 
International Criminal Court has shown itself to be the best 
tool for investigating the acts that have produced the draft 
resolution that could not be adopted today” (Statement by 
Chile at the UNSC, April 2014).
Bachelet and RtoP: Challenges Ahead
Michelle Bachelet’s term in the Presidency (2014-2018) will reinforce 
Chile’s commitment with RtoP. The President herself and the current 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Heraldo Muñoz, had been personally ad-
vocating for the promotion of human rights and the need to hold the 
international community responsible for the prevention and response 
to massive atrocities. At the same time, Chile’s seat as a non-permanent 
member at the United Nations Security Council (2014-2015) will 
provide a unique opportunity to influence the Council’s agenda. Chile 
has been particularly supportive of a wide range of human security 
issues at the UNSC, including women, peace and security, children 
and armed conflict, and the protection of civilians in conflict (Secu-
rity Council Report, 2013). During his time at the Security Council, 
Chile will continue supporting the implementation of RtoP as it was 
evidenced by the country’s co-sponsoring of the resolution referring 
the situation in Syria to the ICC. 
However, if Chile wants to strengthen its position as an RtoP advocate 
and a promoter of human rights more broadly, the country will have to 
invest greater political and economic resources into its international 
foreign policies. The final paragraphs of the conclusions are dedicated 
to highlight some of these challenges.
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At the regional level, Chile’s diplomacy needs to initiate further debates 
among Latin American countries with the aim of coordinating policies 
and initiatives especially on topics in which there is greater regional 
consensus such as early response to emergencies, prevention and me-
diation, and peace-building. Brazil’s concept note on Responsibility 
while Protecting was a lost opportunity when comes to engaging other 
Latin American countries with this emergent international norm.
At the national level, the problem with Chilean policies on RtoP as 
well with other relevant decisions in related human rights areas is 
that they are fundamentally based on individual leadership rather 
than institutional support. Political leadership was fundamental for 
prompting Chile’s foreign policy towards a greater engagement with 
international human rights in previous administrations. But for Chile 
to gain a more prominent role in this area, further institutionalization 
and local capacities are needed. In the case of RtoP, for example, there 
is no office or government official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in Santiago dealing with the issue. Chile is not part of the RtoP focal 
point initiative sponsored by the Global Center for the Responsibility 
to Protect. The objective of this initiative is to appoint a senior level 
official responsible for the promotion of RtoP at the national level 
who will support international cooperation by participating in a global 
network.16 The lack of appointment of a national focal point reflects 
the fact that Chile’s international actions on RtoP are processed by 
the missions to the United Nations in New York and Geneva. It also 
underscores one of Chile’s shortcomings when dealing with humanitar-
ian issues abroad:  there are very limited domestic capacities dealing 
with RtoP and other topics such as conflict prevention at the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. 
On other topics, such as human rights and human security, specific 
units were created within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet, when 
relevant decisions regarding human rights and international security 
are made, these units show very little capacity for generating responses. 
Rather than elaborating on the state’s human rights policies interna-
tionally, the main task of the human rights division is to respond to 
Chile’s monitoring requirements for international treaties. In sum, 
there is need of further institutionalization of RtoP and human rights 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There is also a greater need to 
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hire new personnel with expertise on this topic and to train younger 
diplomats so they are better prepared to respond to RtoP situations 
and to understand the human rights implications of complex political 
decisions.
Finally, Chile’s non-governmental organizations remain weak, and their 
access to the decision-making process in foreign policy is limited. There 
is no evidence that the political opposition or other relevant groups 
are currently engaged in monitoring Chile’s international action. Fur-
thermore, unlike in the late-1980s and early 1990s, there are very few 
national academic institutions dedicated to the systematic study of 
Chile’s international policies. Thus, there is relatively little pressure 
on the government to keep its previous commitments to international 
human rights. This is an important weakness considering that these 
types of organizations are fundamental to ensuring that states abide 
by international norms, especially in the area of human rights. 
NOTES
1. This article takes some insights from a previous chapter written by the 
author and Claudio Fuentes S. See: Fuentes and Fuentes forthcoming 
in 2014. 
2. President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), 
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006), and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010).
3. On Special Procedures see: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/SP/
Pages/Introduction.aspx
4. For a detailed description on these reports see: (Vargas 2012)
5. Notes for the speech of H.E. President Michelle Bachelet at the meeting 
with Human Rights Watch, New York, September 2007. See http://www.
hrw.org/en/news/2007/09/25/chilean-president-visits-human-rights-
watch (accessed January 20, 2011).
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6. Among them it is possible to include: Heraldo Muñoz, Juan Gabriel 
Valdes, Alberto van Klaveren, and Carlos Portales. Also the first head 
of Human Rights Unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a very well 
known human rights lawyer, Roberto Garreton and the appointments 
that followed as head of this unit were all professionals with extensive 
experience in human rights. 
7. Despite being one of the first nations to sign the Rome Statute, 
the country’s ratification process was delayed by a number of legal 
and constitutional difficulties and could only be ratified after the 
Chilean Chamber of Deputies approved a constitutional amendment 
recognizing the Court’s jurisdiction.
8. This network involves thirteen countries: Austria, Canada, Chile, 
Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, 
South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand.
9. The Community of Democracies was initiated by seven countries: 
Poland, Chile, the Czech Republic, India, the Republic of Korea, Mali, 
and the United States. Today, this organization consists of seventeen 
member countries. In 2000, in Warsaw, ministerial delegations from 
106 countries signed the final declaration calling for the establishment 
of the Community of Democracies, see http://community-democracies.
org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=
23 (accessed February 15th, 2011). 
10. Av a i l a b l e  a t :  h t t p : / / w w w. u n . o rg / g a / s e a r c h / v i e w _ d o c .
asp?symbol=A/65/730&Lang=E
11. See, Chilean Embassy in Haiti: http://chileabroad.gov.cl/haiti/
12. For more details regarding the Chilean position during the 2005 World 
Summit see: a) Statement by Ambassador Alfredo Labbé, “Meeting 
of the Plenary Assembly on the Reform of the United Nations”. New 
York, 21 June 2005. b) Group of Friends of the UN Reform, non paper 
“The Responsibility to Protect, Civilian Protection, and the High level 
Panel Report”, May 25, 2005.
13. The Permanent mission of Chile to the UN in New York convened 
a meeting on March 2012 under the title: “RtoP: Una Mirada en el 
Futuro”. 
14. Find the video of the conference at: http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/
RtoP.cfm
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15. Find the resolution at:  http:/ /www.securitycouncilreport.
o r g / a t f / c f / % 7 B 6 5 B F C F 9 B - 6 D 2 7 - 4 E 9 C - 8 C D 3 -
CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_348.pdf
16. For a description of the initiatives and a list of member states see: 
http://www.globalRtoP.org/our_work/RtoP_focal_points
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